e emerging blockchain technology supports decentralized computing paradigm shi and is a rapidly approaching phenomenon. While blockchain is thought primarily as the basis of Bitcoin, its application has grown far beyond cryptocurrencies due to the introduction of smart contracts. Smart contracts are self-enforcing pieces of so ware, which reside and run over a hosting blockchain. Using blockchain-based smart contracts for secure and transparent management to govern interactions (authentication, connection, and transaction) in Internet-enabled environments, mostly IoT, is a niche area of research and practice. However, writing trustworthy and safe smart contracts can be tremendously challenging because of the complicated semantics of underlying domain-speci c languages and its testability. ere have been high-pro le incidents that indicate blockchain smart contracts could contain various code-security vulnerabilities, instigating nancial harms. When it involves security of smart contracts, developers embracing the ability to write the contracts should be capable of testing their code, for diagnosing security vulnerabilities, before deploying them to the immutable environments on blockchains. However, there are only a handful of security testing tools for smart contracts. is implies that the existing research on automatic smart contracts security testing is not adequate and remains in a very stage of infancy. With a speci c goal to more readily realize the application of blockchain smart contracts in security and privacy, we should rst understand their vulnerabilities before widespread implementation.
INTRODUCTION
Smart Contracts (SC) have grown in popularity in the recent past years and are believed to be the next generation of automation in inter-party agreements in the blockchain-based systems. Smart contracts are self-directing agreements implemented through a piece of so ware whose autonomous execution applies the terms of the se lement and measurements. e main idea behind SC is to urge obviate traditional trusted third parties (authority, entity or organization) to be replaced by pieces of code running on a decentralized and immutable system. is new paradigm of SC applications opens the door to many opportunities. One of the promising areas is for the IoT security and forensics which has drawn a lot of a ention from both academia and the enterprise world [14, 17, 20, 24, 39, 43] . In fact, the implementation and use of blockchain has far surpassed its original intended purpose as the backbone to the world's rst decentralized cryptocurrency.
e value of a trustless, decentralized ledger that carries historic immutability has been recognized by other industries looking to apply the core concepts to existing business processes. ese unique properties of the blockchain make its application an a ractive idea for many areas of business, including IoT. e major issue in IoT security is to control and know 'who' will be connecting to the network across a large number of things (e.g. sensors and devices) without breaching data privacy [12] . Decentralized smart contracts on blockchains seem to be a vital remedy [44] , [11] , [2] , especially in dealing with security aws in widely distributed IoT nodes [5] . e blockchain technology [42] is the essential means for delivering this trust model envisioned by smart contracts, and appears to hold great promise for future IoT advancement.
Although blockchain technology is perceived as secure by design, its embedded applications (i.e. SC) in dynamic environments (such as IoT) may introduce vulnerabilities in real life situations [30] . A er all, these smart contract applications controlling nodes and transactions are snippets of code wri en by fallible human developers. Besides, because of their special nature, mistakes or bugs can have a signi cant nancial impact, hence security is of utmost importance.
To date, smart contracts have been a ected by unfortunate incidents and a acks (e.g., reentrancy problem in 'splitDAO' function caused $40 million loss in June 2016 [3] , and $32 million was stolen by a ackers due a bug within the code in November 2017 [13] ).
ese high-pro le incidents demonstrate developers (even those with experiences) may put behind security bugs in smart contracts that could create serious vulnerabilities for a ackers' misuse [31] .
is would be further extended in IoT environments because of their sheer size and velocity [40] . us, writing trustworthy and safe smart contracts can be extremely di cult due to the complicated semantics of underlying domain-speci c languages and its testability. One e ective way to mitigate this issue is, every developer embracing the ability to write their smart contracts should be capable of testing their own code, against vulnerabilities, via automated static code analysis tools [10] , [35] , and before deploying them to the immutable environments on blockchains. Being aware of the security pitfalls involved with writing smart contracts as a preventive strategy to avoid known mistakes and vulnerabilities is a smart choice, since the cost of failure on a blockchain that handles an IoT network can be very high. Currently, the state of empirical knowledge within the area of smart contracts security is in embryonic form. us, the aim of this paper is to take this initiative by providing a rst-time empirical evaluation of static smart contracts security testing tools, for Ethereum as the most widely used blockchain in the community and its popular domain-speci c programming language, Solidity. As the so ware and security engineering research community has long relied on Free and Open Source So ware (FOSS) tools for security testing, our main emphasis would be on open source tools as well. With this empirical analysis, the objective of the research is to assess the four FOSS tools (namely Oyente [25] , Mythril [29] , Securify [22] , and SmartCheck [38] ) based on their vulnerability detection e ectiveness and the accuracy. To accomplish the stated objective, we ponder to examine the accompanying research questions:
• RQ1 -How e ective are the automated smart contract security testing tools, in terms of vulnerability detection ability? And what is the most e ective tool? • RQ2 -What are the accuracy scores obtained by the automated testing security tools in detecting true vulnerabilities?
To manage RQ1 and RQ2, we carried out large-scale experiments among the aforementioned tools. Based on the presented research questions, the subsequent hypotheses were detailed:
• Null hypothesis (H 0Ef f ) = ere is no signi cant di erence in vulnerability detection e ectiveness between the four smart contract security testing tools. It can be expressed as: H 0Ef f : µ O ent e = µ M thr il = µ Secur if = µ Smar tCheck . Where, µ t is the mean detection e ectiveness of testing tool t measured on all the participating smart contracts (as shown in Eq. (1)).
• Alternative hypothesis (H 1Ef f ) = ere is signi cant difference in vulnerability detection e ectiveness between the four automated tools. It can be expressed as: Given z = {Oyente, Mythril, Securify, SmartCheck}, x and y as two single-valued variables belonging to z, therefore,
• Null hypothesis (H 0Acc ) = ere is no signi cant di erence in accuracy scores between the four automated tools. It can be expressed as: H 0Acc : θ O ent e = θ M thr il = θ Secur if = θ Smar tCheck . Where, θ t is the mean of the accuracy of testing tool t measured on all the participating smart contracts (as shown in Eq. (2)).
• Alternative hypothesis (H 1Acc ) = ere is signi cant di erence in accuracy scores between the four automated tools. It can be expressed as: Given z = {Oyente, Mythril, Securify, SmartCheck}, x and y as two single-valued variables belonging to z, therefore, H 1Acc :
Within our exploration, there is only one independent variable, i.e. the security testing tool designed for smart contracts. For this main factor there are four treatments (tools): Oyente, Mythril, Securify, SmartCheck (See Section 2.1). e vulnerability detection effectiveness and the accuracy are the dependent variables measured in this work. We are collecting the following four building-block metrics to measure the dependent variables:
• True Positive -TP c : tool correctly identi es a real vulnerability in contract c.
• False Negative -FN c : tool fails to identify a real vulnerability in contract c.
• True Negative -TN c : tool correctly ignores a false alarm in contract c.
• False Positive -FP c : tool fails to ignore a false alarm in contract c.
e vulnerability detection e ectiveness of a tool is measured as following (which is also referred to as Recall [37] or sensitivity):
Where n is the number of smart contracts used, and j represents a given tool (i.e., j = 1, 2, 3, 4).
e accuracy score of a tool is measured as following (which is essentially a Youden Index [41] ):
e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the current tools and background in smart contracts. Section 3 gives and describes the experimental setup; Section 4 gives experimental design and validity. Section 5 analyzes the obtained data and discusses the results; Section 6 presents the related work in the literature; and nally, Section 7 reports the conclusions.
BACKGROUND
e concept of smart contract was initially perceived at the source code level, 'code is law'. e code-based testing not only in blockchain programming (including smart contracts development) but also in other computing paradigms is still favored and e ective as it determines a reasonable degree of reliance on the most comprehensive artifact of development process, and before deploying it to the hosting environment [32, 34] . In addition, due to the special nature of smart contracts on the blockchain, static security analysis prior to deployment seems to be the perfect t. Inspired by this, the paper primarily focuses on the automated static smart contracts security tools (see Section 2.1) in the Ethereum blockchain by focusing its a ention on Solidity (see Section 2.2).
Automated Smart Contract Security Testing Tools
ere are a handful of tools for automated smart contract (wri en in Solidity) security vulnerability testing based on code-level analysis. We give a synopsis of the four most related FOSS tools that we used in our experiments, namely Oyente [25] , Mythril [29] , Securify [22] , and SmartCheck [38] . Table 1 shows the summary of the selected tools and their main properties. Level of rigor, ranging from syntactic, heuristic, analytic to fully formal, refers to underlying security testing technique of the given tool.
e Analysis basis column represents the type of artifact (source code, byte code, or binary) that a tool uses as its input source.
Solidity, EVM, and Ethereum Smart Contracts
Ethereum is a consensus-based framework that utilizes the blockchain technology to o er a globally open decentralized computing platform, referred to as Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). EVM programs are implemented in bytecode that operates on a simple stack machine supporting a handful of instructions. Contracts reside on the blockchain in an Ethereum-speci c binary format (EVM bytecode). Developers, however, do not usually write low-level EVM codes for contracts. Instead, they typically use a high-level language in an exceedingly JavaScript-like syntax called Solidity that compiles into bytecode to be uploaded on the blockchain. Ethereum is gaining a substantial popularity in the blockchain community, since the major purpose of EVM programs is as smart contracts that manage digital assets [8] , and for creating decentralized applications (dApps). Solidity [16] is a domain and platform-speci c language that is designed for writing smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. It has been the most widely used open-source programming language in implementing public and private blockchains [36] . e syntax of Solidity is analogous to ECMAScript (JavaScript), where the resulting code associated with a smart contract is compiled to bytecode and then is run on the EVM to execute the functionality of the contract.
Similar to di erent blockchain platforms (e.g., Bitcoin, Hyperledger Fabric), Ethereum provides a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for the users.
e underlying Ethereum blockchain database is supported and updated by the participating nodes connected to the current network. Each node on the network runs the EVM and executes identical set of directions. e Ethereum platform itself is featureless or value-agnostic. It is up to organizations and developers to choose its utilization in view of their business objectives. In any case, certain application composes assortments bene t more than others from Ethereum's capabilities. In particular, Ethereum is ed to applications that automate coordinate association between peers or encourage facilitated bunch activity over a network. For example, applications for planning digital commercial centers, or the computerization of complex nancial related contracts. With regards to programming on Ethereum, there are some key focuses to note from the Ethereum Design Rationale (EDR) document [15] . In the context of Ethereum, a typical smart contract is recognized by a unique contract address rendered a er a successful production of a creation transaction. A blockchain state is hence a mapping from addresses to nodes' accounts in the network, where each smart contract account holds an associate quantity of virtual coins (Ether -the contract balance) by possessing its own non-public state and storage. Figure 1 shows an illustrative sample for a user-de ned smart contract, named Puzzle [25] .
is contract manages a simple reward system in which whoever solves a problem (i.e. puzzle) will get rewards. To make this contract up and running, the EVM bytecode of the contract is rst sent to miners through a contractcreation transaction. Once the transaction is admi ed into a block (has to pass through mining process) in the hosting blockchain, a unique address for Puzzle is generated. en each miner instantiates the contract by executing its constructor (Line 8), and a local storage is assigned in the blockchain. Finally, the main code implemented in the anonymous function of Puzzle (Lines 15) is added to the contract's storage. Once the contract is live on the blockchain, it can be used to deliver its service to users. Whenever a user submits his/her solution, a contract-invoking transaction gets directed to the associated address of the contract. is in turn triggers the execution of the main function de ned at Line 15. In this case, all the sender's information, the Ether amount, and the input data of the invoking transaction will be stored in the msg variable. e contract then processes the receiving data and handles the reward according to its business logic wri en in the main function. When a correct solution is received, the contract automatically redeems the reward to the sender by executing the code at Line 24.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
e general process of experiments is depicted in Figure 2 . e operation process starts with choosing a security testing tool in a random manner, i.e. treatment, following by acquiring a chosen random smart contract from the pool of contracts.
Figure 2: e general experiment execution process
Tools without a Web-based UI were run from their source les on an online compiler, i.e. Remix 1 as Solidity IDE, or solc command-line Solidity compiler -whichever possible. We followed the instructions on tools' respective GitHub pages to con gure installation. Prior to the experiment, we compiled all contracts and made sure they were all free from compilation errors.
A er running the tools against each smart contract, we recorded the security threats they raised, and assessed whether or not they accurately identi ed the known vulnerabilities, given the fourfundamental metrics of classi cation, TP, FN, TN, FP.
As with any experimental se ing, we were required to collate a set of object programs (in our case 'vulnerable smart contracts') through observation of experiments execution process. One of the challenges we faced was the di culty of nding representative contracts to use in our study without ge ing involved in legal and privacy issues. Historically, authors or developers have seen the availability of deliberately vulnerable products (such as vulnerable Website for Web Apps security testing) as a practical solution to pursue their studies without the fear of prosecution. In this spirit and a er an exhaustive search in the online resources, we found two suitable publicly-available sources of intentionally vulnerable contracts: (1) contracts developed by Trail of Bits 2 , a dedicated security team on foundational tools and deep expertise in cryptography and Ethereum security; (2) contracts developed by the Ethernaut 3 wargame, an online smart contract hacking challenge by Zeppelin. Although one of the participating tool (Mythril) comes with a collection of test contracts 4 , we decided not to use those with a speci c end goal to make the evaluation fair-minded and to give a reasonable equivalent platform for analyzing all the tools.
A erwards, we selected a suit of ten contracts wri en in Solidity, as presented in Table 2 . ese contracts encompass a wide range of real-world vulnerabilities (including Integer Over ow, Missing Constructor, Reentrancy, Unchecked External Call, Unprotected Function, Wrong Interface, Callstack Depth A ack, Assertion Failure, Timestamp Dependency, Parity Multisig Bug, Transaction-Ordering Dependence (TOD, etc.) with many instances for each class of vulnerability. In this way, the outcomes started from these contracts for the proposed experiments will give premise to drawing more convincing bits of knowledge. We intentionally only chose open source contracts to ensure that our experiments can be replicated by public access to the source code. All experiments were conducted on a similar computer (to maintain a strategic distance from ecological predisposition) utilizing solc compiler (v0.4.21) on an Intel Core i7 at 2.9 GHz and 16 Gb RAM, under Mac OS operating system. All applied statistical tests were run using IBM SPSS Statistics v.25 to decide the rejection or acceptance of formulated null hypotheses. To help selecting the proper statistical tests, we performed normal probability plots on the experimental data using p-p and q-q plots and residual analysis to gain insights into the distribution of the data. In view of the dependent variables and the results of normality plots, we utilized the ANOVA test which is solid and reliable. In all hypothesis testing, a 5% signi cance level was chosen, henceforth we acknowledge a 5% likelihood of commi ing a type-I-error that is rejecting a null hypothesis when it is sure.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND VALIDITY
We designed our experiments as a randomized block with no human subjects included. Each smart contract was utilized speci cally once to measure the impact of each treatment (tool). In other words, each of four security testing tools were randomly applied on the same ten smart contracts.
is design helped to divide the variability into variability due to tools (i.e. treatments) and variability due to smart contracts (i.e. blocks). us, the impact of the tools could be analyzed without meddling from the impact of contracts covering the result of the investigations. e statistical analysis was based on the formal model [33] 
e threats to validity of this empirical research are as per the following. Concerning external validity, we used a subset of wellknown open-source smart contracts from the blockchain community in assessing and testing smart contracts.
e chosen smart contracts are generally suitable in terms of size and the number of functionalities. Without a doubt, they are su ciently enormous to be reasonable and make the experiment practical. Moreover, the object programs contain diverse types of common vulnerabilities. As for the security testing tools, the chosen ones are the most commonly cited and used tools available in the literature at the time of this experiment. e threats to conclusion validity are concerned with the statistical analysis underling the conclusions. We selected our statistical tests based a thorough pre-analysis of the normality assessment of experiment's data (using p-p and q-q plots). As prescribed by plots, ANOVA and LSD (least signi cant di erence) tests were chosen to investigate the null hypotheses (H 0Ef f and H 0Acc ), which are solid. All the assumptions required by ANOVA test were further met. erefore, the error rate would not be evident and the threat to conclusion validity could be minor.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
e collected data are analyzed and discussed with respect to each research question in this section. In addition to descriptive analysis of data, we further perform hypothesis testing using ANOVA and LSD statistical tests to report on the signi cance of the results.
Analysis of E ectiveness (RQ1)
e main visualization technique that we used to contrast the performance of tools was the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC 5 ) analysis.
e ROC curve shows how the recall vs. precision relationship changes, and we can learn a lot about a tool accuracy from this analysis. A ROC curve plots the true positive rate on the y-axis while the false positive rate is shown on the x-axis. e true positive rate (TPR) is the recall (sensitivity) and the false positive rate (FPR) is 1-speci city (i.e. Following OWASP benchmark project 6 , Figure 3 shows the interpretation guide for ROC plots. Each plot shows a point plo ed on the chart which provides a visual indication of how well a tool did in security vulnerability detection task.
Figure 3: Interpretation guide
As it can be seen from Figure 4 , Oyente tool is not a good instrument since it is far from top le zone (ideal tool). is tool shows two breaking points when it crossed the guessing line and scored lower than random possibilities. is could be a strong disadvantage of this analyzer. Additionally, as we observed Oyente raised several outdated vulnerabilities that deal with class-stack depth as well as various falsely transaction-ordering dependence (TOD) alarms. Figure 5 shows the ROC plot for the Securify tool. Securify showed a steady performance throughout the trials. It had a large number of false positives, but is still catching more threats that Oyente was missing. Figure 6 shows the ROC plot for the Mythril tool. By looking at the graph, it is obvious that Mythril was able to detect more vulnerabilities compared to Oyente and Securify tools. It can be concluded that Mythril has a reasonable sensitivity and can be considered a trustworthy tool.
As it can be seen from Figure 7 , SmartCheck showed a high degree of sensitivity compared to all other tested tools. Although, there was a steady ramp in the graph, this could be due to poor design in some of the contracts' logics. Figure 8 contrast the percentages of e ectiveness obtained from the testing tools over the ten smart contracts. e x-axis represents the ten smart contracts used and the y-axis signi es the e ectiveness score for each single tool applied as result of the experiment. Neither tool catches everything, but it is clear that SmartCheck achieved much be er score compared to its peers. Overall, the E f f values of all smart contracts (10 out of 10) for SmartCheck tool have the highest gures. Figure 9 illustrates the total mean of the vulnerability detection e ectiveness each tool from all ten smart contracts. e y-axis shows the tools and the x-axis shows the percentage of the average e ectiveness. As it can be seen from the gure, SmartCheck accounted for the highest e ectiveness in detection ability while the rest of tools had much lower statistics in all. e provided descriptive comparisons ( Figure 8 and Figure 9 ) intuitively give some insights into the e ectiveness of the automated security testing tools in which not all data are identical (i.e. µ O ent e µ Secur if µ M thr il µ Smar tCheck ). While SmartCheck demonstrated be er results, this could make it conceivable to indicate that a distinction in vulnerability detection ability was noticed. Yet, it would not be adequate to reach conclusions, including rejecting the null hypothesis (H 0Ef f ), as it still requires conducting the statistical tests (given below) to decide the signi cant of the di erences. Table 3 shows the results of ANOVA test on the e ectiveness of the tools. Given Table 3 and based on the decision rule, reject H 0 if p-value ¡ α (whereas 0.0003 < 0.05).
erefore, the null hypothesis (H 0Ef f ) is rejected and we can accept the alternative hypothesis, H 1Ef f . In light of this analysis, the conclusion was drawn that there is a statistically signi cant distinction in the vulnerability capability of security testing tools for smart contracts.
Furthermore, a post-hoc statistical test by means of least signicant di erence (LSD) was performed to help ascertain where the di erences between tools lie and nd the most e ective security testing tool. Because, the ANOVA tests alone was not able to indicate which speci c testing tools were signi cantly di erent from each other.
e results of this particular LSD test are shown in Table 4 . For each pair of the tools the mean di erence between their E f f scores (Eq.1), the standard error of the di erence, the signi cance level of the di erence, and a 95% con dence interval are shown. Signi cant outcomes are set apart with a mark (*) by SPSS so ware. In this case, SmartCheck tool demonstrated a signi cant di erence compared to all other tools (Sig. < 0.05). 
Analysis of Accuracy (RQ2)
Only achieving the highest e ectiveness rate at any precision would not be a veritable pointer of best performance when it comes to real-world applications and tools. In this manner, it would be as imperative to investigate the accuracy scores obtained by the tools concerning false alarms to arrive at a more solid assessment. From a technical perspective, this two-facet evaluation would encourage fellow researchers and developers to pick the well-ed tool by observing the trade-o between the e ectiveness and the accuracy. e experiment results related to this aspect of analysis are presented in Figure 10 and Figure 11 . Figure 10 shows the percentages of accuracy scores obtained for the tools over the ten smart contracts. e x-axis shows the ten smart contracts and the y-axis signi es the percentage of accuracy for each tool in the experiment. From the gure, Mythril and SmarkCheck tools almost outperformed all other peer tools in all ten smart contracts with recording highest accuracy scores. On the average basis and interestingly, Mythril tool showed the highest accuracy score, though it had less e ectiveness than SmartCheck. Overall, it is safe to say that there were di erences observed in the accuracy of all the testing tools, but descriptive results could indicate that the Mythril and SmartCheck tools are more accurate than Oyente and Securify with less false alarms. e ANOVA and LSD statistical tests performed below show the signi cant of the di erences.
Hypothesis testing (H 0Acc ): To factually exhibit the accuracy's di erences between the tools under evaluation, the ANOVA was once again carried out to check the respected hypothesis (H 0Acc ). Likewise with the past ANOVA test on the e ectiveness, the condence level of signi cance for the hypothesis testing was set to α = 0.05 as well. Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of ANOVA statistical test and LSD respectively.
As it can be seen from Table 5 , p-value (0.0002) is less than α = (0.05), thus the results suggest rejecting the null hypothesis H 0Acc in favor of the alternative H 1Acc at the 0.05 signi cance level. Following the recommendation, the choice was made to dismiss the null hypothesis and as needs be, acknowledge the alternative hypothesis.
As we were keen to nd out where the contrasts between the testing tools lie, a LSD test was additionally performed to indicate the di erences in a pair-wise manner. For each couple of the tools the mean di erence between their accuracy scores (Eq. (2)), the standard error of the di erence, the signi cance level of the di erence, and a 95% con dence level are shown. Notably, Mythril and SmartCheck tools demonstrated signi cant di erences in all pairs with the remaining tools (Sig. < 0.05).
Finally, it can be concluded that the results of these experiments seemingly set up a trade-o between the vulnerability capability detection and the accuracy of smart contract-speci c security testing tools in the Ethereum blockchain, likewise with classic trade-o between e ectiveness and e ciency reported in the literature in all realms of testing.
RELATED WORK
e nature of work given in this paper is generally related to security testing and vulnerability assessment of smart contracts on the blockchain. is section presents the related work (including approaches and tools) and secondary studies (including experiments and surveys) in this area.
Most recently, Parizi et al. [31] , conducted an empirical analysis of smart contract programming languages based on usability and security from new developers point of view. ey selected three programming languages for their experiment, i.e. Solidity, Pact 7 (a high-level language for the Kadena 8 platform) and Liquidity 9 (a high-level language for the Tezos 10 platform).
e results of their experiment indicated that new contract developers found Solidity to be the most e cient language with the highest usability score and the shortest average implementation times. But, it was found that 73.33% of implemented Solidity contracts had security vulnerabilities, while no known security vulnerabilities were found in contracts implemented with Pact and Liquidity. In conclusion, the study concluded that although Solidity is the most usable language to a new developer, it is also the most vulnerable to malicious a acks as new developers tend to leave behind security vulnerabilities which can leave the contracts insecure.
Destefanis et al. [13] advocated the need for a discipline of Blockchain So ware Engineering (BOSE), addressing the security issues posed by smart contract programming and other applications running on the Ethereum blockchain. e authors presented a case study of the Parity 11 wallet's smart contract library, where poor programming practices led to a situation where an anonymous user was able to freeze about 500K Ether (150M USD) in November 2017.
e analysis of the case led to the authors concluding that vulnerability of the library was mainly due to a negligent programming activity rather than a problem in the Solidity language.
Atzei et al. [3] provided a systematic exposition of the security vulnerabilities of Ethereum and Solidity. e authors presented a taxonomy of causes of vulnerabilities, classifying them on three levels namely Solidity (Call to the unknown, Gasless send, Exception disorders, Type casts, Reentrancy, keeping secrets), EVM (Immutable bugs, Ether lost in transfer, Stack size limit) and Blockchain (Unpredictable state, Generating randomness, Time constraints). Additionally, the authors accompanied their taxonomy with actual a acks which exploit detected vulnerabilities except Type casts, Ether lost in transfer and generating randomness vulnerabilities. To conclude their survey, the authors recommended the process of formal veri cation of smart contracts to ensure that the intended behavior and the actual behavior of the smart contracts are exactly the same. Moreover, the authors suggested the use of Turingincomplete, human-readable languages for formal veri cation as the choice of Turing complete languages limits formal veri cation.
While the above-mentioned works primarily focused on comparing and highlighting the possible security vulnerabilities with Ethereum and Solidity, the works mentioned below focus on minimizing and mitigating security vulnerabilities with various approaches for veri cation of smart contracts [26] on the Ethereum blockchain.
Abdellatif and Brousmich [1] proposed a semantics-based formal method approach for ver cation of smart contracts and blockchain properties. e authors modeled a smart contract's behavior and interactions with its hosting environment by applying this approach through an illustrative example. ey simulated these behaviors in the BIP (Behavior Interaction Priorities) framework [6] , equipped with a series of runtime veri cation and simulation engines [7] . In this study, results were analyzed using a SMC (Statistical Model Checking) [23] tool, which allowed the authors to reveal scenarios where the smart contract behaviors could be compromised by malicious users.
Bhargavan et al. [8] designed a framework to examine and verify the runtime safety and the functional correctness of the Ethereum contracts by translation to F*, a functional programming language aimed at program veri cation. e authors proposed two prototype tools which translate the contracts to F* programs for developing more secure end-contracts. In a similar work, Grishchenko et al. [18] presented the rst complete small-step semantics of EVM bytecode, which they formalized in the F* proof assistant based on a combination of hyper-and safety properties, obtaining executable code that they successfully validated against the o cial Ethereum test suite.
Mavridou and Laszka [27] introduced FSolidM 12 , a framework rooted in rigorous semantics for designing smart contracts as Finite State Machines (FSM). e authors presented a tool for creating FSM on a highly usable GUI and for automatically generating Ethereum smart contracts. e authors [28] provided a demonstration of the FSolidM tool in a later work.
Kalra et al. [21] proposed a framework 'ZEUS' to verify the correctness and validate the fairness of smart contracts. ZEUS leverages both abstract interpretation and symbolic model checking, along with the power of constrained horn clauses to quickly verify contracts for safety. e authors built a prototype of ZEUS for Ethereum and Fabric 13 blockchain platforms and evaluated it 12 h ps://github.com/anmavrid/smart-contracts 13 h ps://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric with smart contracts. e evaluation found 94.6% of contracts (containing cryptocurrency worth more than USD 0.5 billion) to be securely vulnerable.
Breindenbach et al. [9] proposed the Hydra Framework, which is a principled approach for modeling and administering bug bounties that incentivize bug disclosure.
e framework transforms programs via N-of-N-version programming (NNVP), a variant of classical N-version programming [4] that runs multiple independent program instances. e Hydra Framework was applied to sample smart contracts and it was concluded it could greatly amplify the power of bounties to incentivize bug disclosure by economically rational adversaries.
Lastly, Idelberger et al. [19] investigated the possibilities of using logic-based smart contracts on blockchain systems to boost their general safety and security. e authors demonstrated that a logical-based approach could bene cially complement its procedural counterpart with respect to the negotiation, formation, storage/notarizing, enforcement, monitoring and activities related to dispute resolution. It was proven that the logic and procedural approaches are not incompatible, contrarily, they have the potential to advantageously complement each other for more quality contracts.
In summary, it can be said that sound empirical studies in the eld of smart contract security is currently lagging as compared to primary studies. To the extent of our knowledge, the work presented in this paper was the rst of its kind that statistically analyzes and evaluates security analysis tools for smart contracts based on the e ectiveness in vulnerability detection and the accuracy.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive empirical evaluation of open source automatic security analysis tools for the security vulnerability detection of Ethereum smart contracts wri en in Solidity. We tested those tools on ten real-world smart contracts from both vulnerability e ectiveness and accuracy of true detection viewpoints. e results of our experiments showed that SmartCheck tool is statistically more e ective than the other automated security testing tools at 95% signi cance level (p < 0.05). Concerning the accuracy, Mythril was found to be signi cantly (p < 0.05) accurate with issuing the lowest number of false alarms among peer tools.
ese results could imply that SmartCheck could currently be the most e ective static security testing tool for Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain but perhaps less accurate than Mythril.
As a general conclusion, our work indicates that research on the empirical knowledge evaluation of security testing for smart contracts is scarce in the literature, especially in relation to IoT, as perhaps this domain is still in a state of infancy. Hence, our work contributed towards lling this gap by providing: (1) a ne-grained methodology to conduct such empirical study for future use by fellow researchers, (2) comparable experimental results on the stateof-the-art smart contracts security testing tools, and (3) statistical tests and constructive insights into the challenges associated with testing smart contracts. We hope our work motivates researchers and developers to come up with more new and innovative ideas, frameworks, and tools that would result in writing safer, secure and vulnerability-immune smart contracts in the future. In our view, IoT combined with smart contracts on blockchains are helpful in building more trustworthy and secure networks, and it would appear to hold great promise for future IoT security development.
